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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, impact of merger and acquisition announcement on share prices of 
acquiring firms was examined. First theoretical framework was clarified by giving 
definitions, explaining the types of integrations with advantages and disadvantages. Second 
the most outstanding motives for entering a merger and acquisition deal such as economies 
of scale, hubris, synergy, tax advantages, transfer of know-how etc. laid out in detail. Then 
merger waves were described through the events causing and terminating them, fundamental 
outcomes. Event study methodology conducted throughout the research. Sample is made up 
of 80 observations for the period of 1994-2014. Apart from full sample analysis, three 
comparison groups which are “form of transaction”, “industry relatedness”, “target public 
status” were formed and their impact on the share prices were measured separately. 
Consequently, it is proved that M&A disclosures have a very insignificant impact on 
acquiring companies’ share prices.  
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ÖZET 
 
 Bu çalışmada şirket satın alma ve birleşme haberlerinin  alıcı fırmanın hisse senetleri 
üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. İlk olarak tanımlamalar yapılarak, birleşme şekilleri avantaj 
ve dez avantajlarıyla açıklanarak çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi sunulmuştur. İkinci olarak 
fırmaları birleşme ve satın alma kararlarına yönlendiren sinerji, ölçek ekonomilerinden 
yararlanma, yöneticilerin kibirleri (hubris), vergi avantajları, know-how transferi gibi öne 
çıkan sebeler detayları ile açıklanmıştır. Sonrasında birleşme dalgaları başlangıç ve bitiş 
sebepleri, sonuçları ile birlikte anlatılmışır. Analiz kısmında olay etüdü yöntemi 
benmsenmiştir. Örneklem 1994-2014 yılları arasında gerçekleşen 80 birleşme ve devralmayı 
içermektedir. Bütün olarak örneklem incelemesine ek olarak örneklemden “birleşme türü”, 
“endüstriyel ilişki (aynı ya da farklı endüstriye ait olma)” ve “satın alınan firmanın halka açık 
ya da özel” olmasına göre alt gruplar oluşturup bunların alıcı firmanın hisse senetleri 
üzerindeki etkileri ayrı ayrı incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak satın alma ve birleşme haberlerinin 
alıcı firmanın hisse senetleri üzerinde istatistiki olarak anlamsız bir etkiye sahip olduğu tespit 
edilmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşme, satın alma, birleşme dalgaları, olay etüdü, kümülatif olağan 
dışı getiri 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In today’s dynamic business environment, in consequence of globalization 
phenomenon national markets started to be replaced by global markets. Almost all the 
countries realized that to national markets are not enough to compete in a global market. New 
competition rules resulting from globalization led companies to concentrate more on 
technological investments, exploring methods to decrease costs, intensive R&D activities. 
Companies need to be in the adequate size to keep pace with the new business environment 
with extreme competition and proceed with their operations. 
 Nowadays, companies are more emboldened to grow continuously with more 
efficiency in the work processes. There are various reasons behind growth decisions of 
companies such as benefiting from economies of scales, decreasing costs, expanding 
production capacities in case of inadequate demand, entering new markets or controlling the 
market by increasing the market share and eventually making a profit. After a growth 
decision companies face an important choice: “internal or external growth?” Due to 
considerable uncertainty and necessity for a long time of implementation, instead of internal 
growth, commonly external growth is adopted by authorities. The most favored external 
growth method is growing via mergers and acquisitions.  
 Stock returns based on M&A disclosures became a popular research subject in 
literature especially in the second half of 1970s in countries where merger and acquisition 
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operations were prevailing and capital markets were efficient, so as in US and UK. 
Documentation in the finance literature exhibits that stock price performances generally 
actualized above the market (abnormal return) around the M&A announcement day, 
however, these ARs were predominately formed in target share price returns. 
 In Turkey from the beginning of 1990s, there is an observed upsurge in the numbers 
of M&As. In this alteration, Turkish economy being more open to international expansions, 
formation of stock markets and fast progress of the secondary equity market after 1980 
resolutions played a significant role. In the period after 1990s, factors like increase in 
privatization, improvements in the relationship with EU and great interest of foreign capital 
in sectors like financial services and telecommunication had a considerable influence on the 
rise of transaction volumes. Despite these improvements and the rise especially in 2005, 
Turkish literature regarding impacts of the mergers and acquisition on the publicly-traded 
parties’ stock returns are still limited. 
 Main historic data was retrieved from the database of Thompson Reuter's Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) and research conducted for the duration of 1993-2014. However, 
this date set was filtered like the others in the literature to determine the real sample that 
serves the purpose of the research. As a result, 80-observation sample was obtained. 
Filtering criteria is as below: 
i. “The transaction is listed as completed with an announcement date in the sample 
period;  
ii. The acquirer firm is a publicly traded company on the Turkish Stock Exchange (Borsa 
Istanbul);  
iii. The transaction is identified as a “merger”, “acquisition of majority interest”;  
iv. The acquiring firm is a non-financial firm;  
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v. The acquirer does not own more than 20% of the target firm prior to the event date 
and owns at least 50% after the event date” (Reis, 2015) 
 In the first chapter of 3-chapter research, comprehensive definitions were made 
regarding basic merger and acquisition terms, structural forms of M&As, advantages and 
disadvantages of them were explained in details in the light of examples, motives for merger 
and acquisition were exemplified and supported with literature view conducted regarding 
these motives.  
 Second chapter covers the timeline of the merger waves in details. How these waves 
started and ended, what are the main characteristics, which distinguished deal types and 
payment methods come front and what kind of the outcomes they brought are explained. 
 Third chapter is the coverage of literature review. Empirical evidence on “the impact 
of mergers and acquisitions announcements on stock prices of acquirers” was presented in 
two main groups as developed and emerging markets. Lastly, Turkish literature regarding 
this topic was examined and outstanding examples were explained. 
 Fourth and final chapter is the research analysis part. In this part event study 
methodology was described with the steps to follow in the light of brief history. Capital asset 
pricing model, daily returns, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns were shortly 
clarified with formulas. Event windows and sample description was defined through a series 
of criteria. Finally, results are presented and supported with regarding tables. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MERGER AND ACQUISTIONS 
 
1.1 Fundamental Definitions 
 “Merger”, “acquisition” and “takeover” terms are generally used interchangeably in 
the terminology. (Singh, 1971) However, there are clear distinctions among them and it 
would be beneficial to clarify them from the beginning for further understanding. 
 A merger can be simply described as “complete absorption of one company by 
another, wherein the acquiring firm retains its name and identity whereas the acquired firm 
ceases to exist as a separate entity.” In merger, bidder (acquirer) acquires everything that the 
target has such as assets and liabilities. (Sherman & Hart, 2006) 
 A consolidation is like a merger but this time a completely new company is 
established. Separate existence of acquirer and target terminates at this point. Differences 
between parties (acquirer & target) becomes trivial and they combine their power; assets and 
liabilities to function as one. (Ross, et al., 2005) 
 An acquisition can be described as buying an asset (a section, a product line) or stocks 
of another company in a way that give the controlling right to the acquirer on the acquired 
company. Sometimes it can be an entire purchase of another entity. (Snow, 2011) 
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 A takeover does not carry a precise meaning and more like general term to show that 
control of the entity under discussion changed hands. It may refer any transaction that transfer 
the rights of control. (Ross, et al., 2016) 
 
1.2 Structural Forms of Mergers and Acquisition 
 As a result of various merger waves occurred throughout history, three distinctive 
integration types have been developed. Companies should choose the correct form of 
integration which suits their philosophy on growth. The decision of structural integration 
must be settled during the planning process. They can be listed as below:  
 Horizontal M&As 
 Vertical M&As 
 Conglomerate M&As 
 
Table 1.1. Structural Forms of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 Source: Moskovicz, 2018 
 
 
  
Form Feature Example
Horizontal M&A
Firms compete in identical line of 
business, generally competitors
Facebook buys 
Instagram (2012)
Vertical M&A
Firms have the identical 
manufacturing line (e.g. Suppliers-
Retailers)
Exxon merged with 
Mobil (1998)
Conglomerate M&A
Firms are in distinct business lines
Amazon purchased 
Whole Foods (2017)
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 1.2.1 Horizontal M&As 
Horizontal mergers or acquisitions happens with the integration of the parties within 
the similar branch of business, producing identically same or similar products or services 
regardless of their geographic location. (Robert et al., 2010) For instance, a merger of two 
automobile companies one located Germany, the other one located in US can be great 
example of horizontal mergers.  
Horizontal M&As can be a great opportunity for wealth accumulation and have the talent to 
attract the attention of media and authorities. Advantages of horizontal integration can be 
counted as below: 
 
 Benefiting from economies of scale (resource combination) 
 Cost reduction (e.g. elimination of excess usage of resources, allocation of source 
efficiently) 
 Market domination 
 Efficient usage of distribution opportunities 
 Possession of more adept and skillful labor force 
 Possible working capital and CAPEX expenditure reduction. (Dringoli, 2016) 
 
On the other hand, additional costs coming along with the horizontal M&As should not be 
ignored. Some of them can be exemplified as below: 
 Reorganization of fundamental and supplementary activities and removal of 
excessive and unnecessary assets 
 Integration of disparate corporate culture, particularly in marketing and production 
areas 
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 Coordination and controlling complications of a more intricate organization 
 Extra attention on the demand projections, as soon as the market feels satisfied, the 
organization may be affected negatively. (Kudełko, et al., 2015) 
 Integration with the aim of increasing market share and subsequently preventing 
market competition will be subjected to law enforcement. Because such M&As can 
generate monopoly1 in the market and can damage market structure and pricing 
mechanism. (Ülgen &Mirza, 2004) 
 
 1.2.2 Vertical M&As 
 Vertical integration occurs by a manufacturer merging with suppliers or retailers 
which are functioning in the identical business industry. It is the easiest and most preferable 
form of M&As. Manufacturers have collaboration with several suppliers for raw material or 
goods and with a retailer for the sales of the finished goods. The principal aim of vertical 
integration is to decrease the risk against suppliers and retailers (Robert et al., 2010).  
 Vertical integration can occur in two different ways: forward integration and 
backward integration.  In forward integration acquired company take part in the later levels 
of the process. It heads towards to retailer (customer side). In backward integration process 
flows in the opposite direction, this time acquirer takes place in the earlier levels of 
production and the whole process heads towards the supplier side. 
 
                                                          
1“A monopoly is where there is just one firm in the industry, and hence no competition from within the industry.” (Sloman, 
2006) 
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Figure 1.1. Vertical Integration Schema 
 
Source: Robert, Wallace, Moles, 2010 
 
Some of the leverages gain by vertical integration can be listed as below (Dringoli, 2016): 
 Cost reduction in the production cycles due to combined phases (transactional costs) 
 Reduction of costs of raw materials by benefiting from economies of scales   
 CAPEX reduction as the specialize companies takes the control of related phases such 
as resources 
 Reduction of risk and/or improvement in risk management 
 Assurance in the quality of the product in the early phases via backward integration 
and of output, distribution via forward integration 
 Ability to monitor inventory cycles closely in the case of acquisition of the supplier 
 Elimination of the intermediaries or mediators, subsequently reduction of related 
costs 
Nonetheless, potential disadvantages should also be taken into consideration. They can be 
listed as below (Ross et al., 2016): 
 
Acquirer
Retailer (Customer Side)
Supplier (Raw Material)
Forward Integration
Backward Integration
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 Entering into a new line of business 
 Problems regarding managing the new more complex business operations 
 Direct elimination of rivalry in the supply market (via backward integration) 
 Loss of flexibility in the combined corporation 
 While the elimination of mediators decreasing the cost, it may also cause the 
elimination of profit generation by the acquired company for the acquirer 
 
 1.2.3 Conglomerate M&As 
 Conglomerate integration is relatively rare compared to the other two methods. In 
conglomerate integration, acquiring company decides to seek opportunities in different 
sectors/ industries, unrelated to its core operations. (Felton, 1971) 
 Chance to diversify provides compensation for the business side that is 
underperforming 
 Entrance to the new markets and to be introduced to new customers 
 Great tool for business risk diversification 
 Can be used as a marketing tool in case complementary products and services (e.g. 
acquisition of the financial subsidiaries by car retailers to enabling or fastening the 
car purchases) 
Risks conglomerate integration can be listed as below (Jeon & Kim, 2004) 
 Administrating problems arising from the fact that company is operating in separate 
industries 
 Risks caused by resource and capability shortage of the company 
 Requires strong managerial skills 
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 May require the establishment of a new corporate culture 
 Focal point alteration in business activities 
 Conglomerate M&As can be separated into two category which are “pure 
conglomerate mergers” and “mixed conglomerate merger”. Pure conglomerate mergers 
occur between companies that are totally separate and unrelated to each other. On the other 
hand, parties enter mixed conglomerate mergers to pursue either product or market extension. 
(Spivack, 1970) 
 
1.3 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
 There is a vast sort of motives considered valid for M&As such as financial support, 
tax advantages provided by capital markets and synergy.  Basically, no matter how many and 
complicated the reasons for companies entering into M&A agreements are, the main aim 
behind every pace is the net present value increase and the maximization of company 
profitabilities. As companies pursue value-creating opportunities, they grow in the process. 
(Watson & Head, 2007) Especially, during the recent years in which structural changes 
occurring in the economy, the growth process of the businesses accelerated in parallel. 
 There are many reasons behind companies struggling to grow, choose mergers and 
acquisitions to fulfill this purpose. These motives vary regarding the socioeconomic factors 
of the country in which the company maintains the business activities, characteristics of the 
businesses and time. (Piesse et al., 2007) After all the explanations, motives for M&As can 
be listed as below. 
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 1.3.1 Synergy 
 Synergy is a fundamental motive behind companies enters into M&A agreements. In 
the broadest sense, it means the totality of the fragments is worth more than the whole. 
(Gaughan, 2015) The relation among the pieces creates extra value. In M&A concept it 
indicates that after merging company value becomes greater than it being single and separate.  
 Moreover, it may also mean the gains purely coming from totally separate fields as a 
result of the combination. For instance, one personnel in company A may be highly qualified 
to lead X department in company B or another personnel in company B may be perfectly 
suited to sell the products of company A. (Pike & Neale, 2009) 
 To illustrate, a company that has two machines that allow producing 600 and 900 
units respectively. Through merger they could achieve production of 1,800 units per day, 
doubling or tripling the number of machines used in both processes. 
V(AB)> V(A)+V(B) 
 
Synergic impacts emerge from five sources (Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2011): 
 Operating impact arises from managerial economies of scale such as in marketing, 
administration, manufacturing and distribution. 
 Financial impact is the increase in stock prices despite low transaction costs. 
 Tax impact suggests that joint organizations carry less tax burden than single ones. 
 Diversification impact refers that after merges party with weak management 
becomes more powerful and the party with the strong management grows into a more 
efficient system. Consequently, assets of weak management are used more 
effectively. 
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 Market power increases as the competition decreases in the market. However, in 
today’s markets, such kind of mergers are neither desirable nor allowed. 
 
 1.3.2 Economies of Scale 
 Economies of scale denote that by increasing production, the average fixed cost can 
be decreased. So the more products produced, the less average total cost will be. (Megginson 
et al., 2008) However, every production facility has limits and these limits can be extended 
via M&As. Same is applicable to fixed cost, they can be decreased even more in case of an 
M&aA (DePamphilis, 2014) Economies of scale provide leverage to businesses for reducing 
costs by broadening their scope of production. The main aim is to decrease the unit cost of a 
product. Economies of scale are the genuine purpose of horizontal integrations: merged 
companies can accomplish cost reduction by sharing administrative services, executives and 
general management. (Watson & Head, 2007) 
 Mergers can also enable technical economies of scale. For instance, if a high quantity 
of production requiring a great amount of funds case arises, large-scale companies can fund 
such kind of investment rather than small-scale ones. For instance, if you want to print out 
flyers, offer you get is generally like this:  
 
Table 1.2. Economies of Scale Sample 
 
As can be seen in this simple example as the quantity produced increases unit price is 
decreasing. 
Unit Total Price Unit Price
1000 200TRL         0.20TRL        
2000 300TRL         0.15TRL        
3000 400TRL         0.13TRL        
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Figure 1.2. Economies of Scale Graph 
 
 
 1.3.3 Diversification 
 As mentioned before companies have two alternatives to pursue their growth target: 
internal or external growth. Since the application of internal growth is time-consuming, more 
difficult and costly, external growth becomes more favorable. Entering into mergers and 
acquisition agreements is the most basic version of growth. Diversification in this concept 
means business growth outside its main activity area. The central pillar of this theory relied 
upon modern portfolio theory suggested by Harry Markowitz (1952).It is next to impossible 
to attain a perfect investment in the real world which is achieving high returns with low risks 
but the theory asserts that it is possible to accomplish a perfect investment by creating an 
optimal portfolio. That means a portfolio generated with various unrelated instruments can 
reduce the risk with diversification and create an optimal portfolio. This hypothesis sustains 
the idea of M&As motive via diversification. (Motis, 2007) 
 As it was mentioned before, such kind of growth provides financial support.  If one 
segment performs under the expectation, the other one provides financial leverage. 
Additionally, another reason for the acquirer side is that they may want to operate in a more 
14 
 
profitable and with better growth potential industry. The fact that the main industry reached 
its maturity, high competition in market decreasing profitability, slow-down in the growth 
targets can lead a business to grow via diversification. (Elmas, 2007) 
 On the other hand, there are some researches proving that diversification has a 
downward effect on the worthiness on the overall company value. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
to measure the effect of diversification, compared the aggregate values with the individual 
ones for the period 1986-1991 and found 13-15% loss in the value owing to diversification. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) findings support the previous study. They compared Tobin’s-q2 value 
with diversification and found a negative relationship between them. Firms choose to 
diversify performed poorer compared to non-diversified opponents. Moreover, Akbulut and 
Matsusaka (2010) also had similar results with their research which financial results were 
affected negatively due to diversification and according to them agency problems are the 
reason. However, unlike the previous researches, they also found that throughout their 
observation, the combination of bidder and target returns are meaningfully positive and 
significant 
 
 1.3.4 Hubris Hypothesis 
 This theory suggested by Richard Roll (1986) helps to explain the effect of 
overconfidence of management in M&A process. Basically, it assumes that in a takeover 
manager overestimate the benefits of synergy or their abilities to estimate, in other words, 
                                                          
2 “The q-ratio is the ratio of the market value of the acquirer’s stock to the replacement cost of its assets. Firms 
can choose to invest in new plant and equipment or obtain the assets by buying a company with a market value 
of less than what it would cost to replace the assets” (DePamphilis, 2014) 
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they become arrogant. Their individual motives are the priority for them rather than putting 
the benefit of the company as first.  
 The research conducted by Hayward and Hambrick (1997) supports the findings of 
Roll. They found a positive correlation between hubris indicators and premiums payments. 
They examined 106 acquisitions and four of their indicators were heavily correlated with the 
hubris of CEO. Moreover, it was detected that bidding firms’ shareholders had suffered from 
the losses and as the premiums of acquisitions and CEO hubris increment, losses for 
shareholders were also increasing. 
 Furthermore, another study carried out by Seth, Song and Pettit (2000) had similar 
outcomes and findings were parallel with the previous researches. Their study consists of 100 
U.S. overseas deals for the period 1980s. However, they have measured not only the impact 
of the hubris hypothesis but also synergy and managerialism which is very much alike to 
hubris. All in all, in the light of these empirical shreds of evidence, the hubris hypothesis is 
a valid motive for M&A deals. 
 
 1.3.5 Financial Reasons  
 Growth decision is obscurity for companies, should it be internal or external? That 
becomes a greater concern for small and middle-size businesses. They generally face the 
difficulty of growing with internal resources. In such cases merging offer coming from large-
size businesses are accepted (Wild & Rapinet, 2007) and payment regarding purchase is 
generally asked to be made via acquirer’s common stocks. On the other hand, since there will 
not be any cash outflow from the acquirer side, the need for additional funds significantly 
decreases. (Ceylan & Korkmaz, 2018)  
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 In most cases, it is more alluring for managers to merge with another business, which 
has an established system (production, marketing, administration, distribution, etc.), by 
paying via their stocks rather than gathering funds by selling the stocks publicly to obtain 
new capacity. Financial reasons can be explained under two categories (Özden, 2006): 
 
 Excessive free-cash-flow: Companies with excess funds may use these funds to 
purchase fixed-income securities, to pay dividends, to repurchase their own securities 
or to merge with/acquire another company. Among these, “acquiring a company” 
option does not generate an immediate tax impact for acquiring party. That is why it 
becomes an attractive opportunity and fuel for M&As. On the other hand, it can be 
an opportunity for a company with lots of investment possibilities and no cash to 
finance to merge with one with great potential to generate cash in the future. (Brealey, 
et al., 2011) 
 
 Cost of capital reduction: As a theory, debt capacity of the company formed after 
M&A should be greater than the parties separately involved. (Berk & DeMarzo,2014) 
With the synergy effect after M&As take place cost of capital decreases. If one party 
has unused debt capacity, this can be used to finance mergers and acquisition process. 
From the point lender point of view, due to the low level of risk, it is possible to find 
a cheap loan. (Akay, 1997) As a result, the cost of capital after M&As decreases 
compared to before. 
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 1.3.6 Tax Advantages  
 Tax aspect has been a great motive for a number of M&As, on the other hand, there 
are still ongoing debates on this topic. For instance, a lucrative company performing in the 
top tax bracket can benefit via acquiring a company having through accrued tax loss. 
(Auerbach & Reishus, 1987) So, instead of transferring it to the following years to use it in 
the future, immediate usage as tax savings would be more favorable for companies. However, 
it is crucial to mention that benefiting this kind of a deal is more difficult recently due to the 
strict controls and legislation. (Gaughan, 2015) 
 Moreover, for companies with excess cash reserves, this kind of M&A deal can be a 
great advantage for decreasing tax burden. To illustrate, if one company is lacking options 
for internal investment, as mentioned under “free-cash-flow” there are several options ahead 
for the usage of such kind of excess cash: dividend payment, purchasing securities, 
purchasing back their own stocks from the market or acquiring another company. Dividend 
payment to shareholders will end up with abrupt tax payment with the conclusion of the 
distribution. Purchasing securities has a short-term average benefit for companies, however, 
they are inadequate to match the expectations of shareholders. Repurchasing stocks from the 
market and selling them again may create a capital accumulation but nothing more. Acquiring 
another company with the spare cash would provide a clean shortcut and avoidance of tax 
burden. However, it should not be ignored that acquisition premium payments are still more 
than the tax saving, therefore making the tax advantage as the sole motive for an acquisition 
may end up with a loss from acquiring party side. (Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2011) 
 Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson (1988) conducted a research to test the accuracy and 
validity of this theory of gaining tax advantage and found that it is valid only for a small 
group of mergers this motive could be noteworthy. Hayn’s (1989) findings are also in parallel 
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with the previous research. She investigated the importance of tax feature of targets for the 
bidder and target abnormal returns and proved the noteworthy existence of the relation. In 
addition, tax aspect, especially tax-free status provided by it, was a considerable driver for 
acquisition deals. 
 
 1.3.7 Elimination of Inefficiencies 
 If this motive is a driving force for the acquiring party, then this means there are two 
assumptions from their side. First, they believe that the company is underperforming and that 
can be reversed and second highly probably there is an efficiency problem with the 
management with should be corrected.  It is expected then, that poorly managed companies 
are subject to a takeover. Thus, by eliminating these problems, improving the quality of 
management, changing the downward direction of stock prices, new shareholders may be 
attracted. (Watson & Head, 2007) So rather than cash, there are other things that can be 
wasted by mediocre management.  It is essential to mention that the main reason lying 
beneath the takeover nothing to do with the wealth of the joint parties. It is used as a technique 
to substitute the old one with new and efficient. Due to the high positions of the management, 
it can be challenging to dismiss the top personnel and M&As make it much easier and 
practical. (Brealey, et al., 2011) Martin and McConnell’s (1991) findings support this theory 
that in following year of the takeover chief officers are possibly changed. Maximum of 10% 
of replacement amount (for the years (-1, -5)) reaches almost 42% after the takeover had been 
concluded. 
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 1.3.8 Intellectual Property, Expertise & Know-How 
 Parties of an M&A deal may have dissimilar technological competences, corporate 
culture, intellectual properties (copyrights, trademarks, patents, human capital, etc.) and 
know-how. In case of an agreement, all of these strengths will be combined and diffuse 
through the new structure. Eventually, they will gain a solid place in the market or in an 
extreme case they may dominate the market. (Röller et al., 2006) 
 Nowadays, expertise in precise areas is a required specification to be more efficient 
and compete with the rest of the market. So, in case of such need, it is pretty difficult to find 
the required labor force and even more difficult him to obtain success in an unfamiliar 
environment. So instead, getting this force with his already operating unit, in other words, 
acquiring the company owning the labor force would be more target-oriented and fertile in 
considerably less time. (Berk & DeMarzo,2014) 
 What’s more, if the acquirer has a belief that the target company will be in an upright 
position future in the market due to the valuable intellectual property rights it has, acquiring 
party may desire to prevent competition or enlarge invention capacity by taking over the 
company. (Akgüç, 1998) 
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CHAPTER 2 
MERGER WAVES 
2.1 Introduction 
 Cyclical and intensified merger activities appeared mainly in US history during the 
six period are named as merger waves. (Fuad & Gaur, 2019) Historical process of merger 
and acquisition waves can be classified as below. Recurring activity of great amount of 
mergers followed by comparatively less amounts formed these periods. Between the years 
1897-1989 is the materialization of the four waves, from that time until the end of 1980 there 
was a noticeable drop in the merger activities. However, there was opposite movement in 
from the beginning of 1990s till 1992 (commencement of fifth wave). (Gaughan, 2015) 
 
[Appendix A: Table 2.1. Merger Waves] 
 
 2.1.1 First Wave (1897-1904) 
 In 1883, after great depression first merger wave emerged. Two third of mergers 
concluded in this period concentrated on petroleum and food products, metal, mining and 
transportation fields. (Owens, 2009) Peak period was between the years 1898-1902 and in 
1904 the first merge wave ended. Observed M&As during this period and their breakdowns 
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with respect to years are as below. (Eis, 1969) During this period horizontal M&As were 
dominating the market.  
 
Figure 2.1. First Wave Merger Amounts 
 
Source: Gaughan, 2015 
 
 To illustrate, in this period in addition to J.P. Morgen merging with Carnegie and US 
Steel. It merged with more than seven hundred small steel firms. As a result, this enormous 
sized company held control of 80% of overall steel production. That is why, preventing the 
formation of such entities, demolishing the ones already standing in the market and the 
protection of the competition became the official policy of the US government. (Owen, 2009) 
 
Figure 2.2. First Wave Types of Mergers 
 
Source: Fligstein, 1993 
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78% of mergers between the years 1895-1904 were horizontal mergers whereas only 12% of 
them were vertical. Most of the horizontal mergers occurred in this period brought about 
monopolistic market creation. That is why this period is known with the role it played in the 
formation of monopolies. (Kleinert & Klodt, 2002)  
 
 2.1.2 Second Wave (1916-1929) 
 As the first wave was known as the mergers of monopolies, the second wave was 
called as the merge of oligopolies. An oligopoly can be described as an industry controlled 
by only a few producers. (Case et al., 2017) It comes from the same roots that prompted 
monopoly. The main difference between the first and the second wave is that the first wave 
was the creator of the monopolies, the second wave was the initiator of oligopolies 
(monopolistic competition). (Kim, 1998) Horizontal merger forms observed in the first wave 
period lingered through the second wave and at the same time US economy carried on 
altering and booming. During this period, in order to prevent monopolistic formations, a 
stricter regulatory environment was established. As a result, efforts were paid and compared 
to first wave more oligopolistic structures emerged and many vertical integrations occurred. 
(Markham, 1955) continue 
 Moreover, in this period, it is encountered that many unrelated industrial branches 
enter into mergers (pure conglomerate merger). The second wave was concluded with the 
Wall Street Crash of 1929 (Black Thursday) on 24th of October, 1929. Even though this is 
not the sole cause for the Great Depression, it had a great role. With the diminished 
confidence in the business world and with the visible constricted consumption, depression 
got worse. In the second wave investment banks played a crucial role. In those days, there 
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was a more concentrated structure in investment banks, a huge amount of capital was 
controlled by only a tiny group of people. (Sudarsanam, 2003) 
 
 2.1.3 Mid-Period 1940s 
 It would be beneficial to enlighten briefly the period between first and second merger 
waves. Since the market is already in motion of alteration, it would be helpful to understand 
the environment prepared the third wave. The fundamental purpose of this period’s merger 
activities was to relive the tax burden on the shoulders of large businesses. Therefore, 
generally private and small-sized businesses were acquired by the larger ones.  Because taxes 
were high and businesses changing hands within the family was extremely pricey, offering 
businesses for acquisitions became more attractive during this period. (Gaughan, 2015) 
Owing to the minor percentage weights of mergers in overall assets of the industry, we cannot 
mention a concentration on mergers. This period was relatively stagnant; no significant 
technological improvements, no groundbreaking inventions etc. Consequently, we cannot 
mention a rise in the merger amounts. 
 
 2.1.4 Third Wave (1965-1969) 
 Emergence of a new merging wave took more than 20 years due to impacts of the 
great depression in the 1930s and Second World War. Owing to the strict antitrust policies 
in this period, many conglomerate integrations were observed. The third wave is known as 
the year of merger of businesses which are totally unrelated to each other, in other words, the 
era of conglomerates. (Kusstatscher & Cooper, 2005) With the aid of the booming economy, 
the third wave became the era of significant mergers and acquisitions. 
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 Businesses aiming for conglomerate mergers targeted not only product diversification 
but industry differentiation because of the severe antitrust laws restricting the mergers within 
the same industry. Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950 was enacted against the monopolies and 
oligopolies emerged during the first & the second waves and also to strengthen the previous 
act in 1914 (Clayton Antitrust Act). (Gaughan, 2002) Clearly, this act was aiming for the 
protection of competition and when we look at the increasing numbers of conglomerate 
integrations, it was obviously reached. (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991) However, in 1973 with the 
oil crises broken out and economic recession following, third wave period terminated. 
(Gregoriou & Renneboog, 2007) 
 
Figure 2.3. Third Wave Merger Amounts 
 
 Source: Kim, 1998 
 
 
 
 2.1.5 Fourth Wave (1981-1989) 
 This wave occurred as a consequence of the inadequacies generated by the third 
wave’s differentiation and diversification policies. (Bhagat et al., 1990) Diminution trend of 
the mergers monitored from the 1970s until 1980s reversed exactly opposite in 1981. Main 
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characteristics of this period were ease of antitrust policies, enhanced control of shareholders 
and increased competition in capital markets. Businesses started to realize the advantages of 
de-diversifying and move their focus again on core business activities. (Blair, 1993) 
 What makes this period totally different from the previous three is the takeover 
method. Fundamental characteristic of this period is the hostile takeovers3. Corporations and 
strategic partners inclined towards hostile takeover to earn abnormal returns in a very short 
time. Despite the excessive number of hostile takeovers observed, this period is remembered 
with the increased concentration on the strategic integrations. Businesses developed several 
attacks and defend strategy against hostile takeovers. Core effort was downsizing of the 
operations, foregrounding specialization in operations and the correction of extreme 
expansions and diversifications arose during the third wave. (Gaughan, 2015) In brief, main 
motives in this period were re-seizing the control of company’s focal point, shrinking 
company in the process to catch back the focus and consequently, synergy was captured in 
transferring production and technology after mergers. Especially, mergers concentrated on 
the technology-intensive sectors. (Kleinert & Klodt, 2002)  
 At the end of the 1990s economy experienced a slight recession, expansions of 1980s 
slowed down and came to a halt eventually. Moreover, economy also experienced the 
breakdown of the junk bond market (main contributor to hostile takeover rise) in the late 
1990s. Junk bond market was one of the main veins feeding the great majority of leveraged 
buyouts 4(LBOs) at that time. (Hurduzeu & Popescu 2015) In short, all these events prepared 
the conclusion of the fourth merger wave. 
                                                          
3 “A hostile takeover is really quite the same thing as a regular buyout or acquisition. The thing that makes such a takeover 
hostile is the fact that it occurs without the consent of the management of the acquired company.” (Taillard, 2012) 
4 “A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of a company by one or several private equity funds who finance their 
purchase mainly by debt.” (Vernimmen et al., 2014) 
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 2.1.6 Fifth Wave (1992-2000) 
 Fifth merger wave provided various opportunities for businesses similar to its 
predecessor. During this wave, hostile takeovers and short-term financial gambles were 
avoided, instead, friendly and strategic with long-term-promise agreements were focalized. 
Holmström and Kaplan (2001) claim that the reason behind why hostile takeovers declined 
in this period is that companies inclined towards advantageous aspects of LBOs. As it 
happened it the previous waves, this wave falls on the peak point of the economic growth. 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) Throughout this period new peak points were reached in 
the stock markets and in market indices.   
 During expansion and growth period in order to respond to increasing demand, 
businesses started to enter M&A deals. That is why this wave is known as great agreements. 
(Moeller et al., 2005) Furthermore, unprecedentedly enormous international corporations 
arose and the importance of such formations was emphasized. High stock prices encouraged 
companies and the idea of “being big to compete” became popular. The largest M&A deal in 
the history at that time realized in this period. (Lipton, 2006)  
 It can be said that this is also the period of globalization and deregulations. 
Globalization brought about the expansion of the global market and consequently, company 
magnitudes were pushed to follow this movement. Moreover, deregulation made entry and 
the exit to the market easier. International competitors entered the market against local 
competitors for the elimination of the monopolistic structures and eventually, cross-border 
M&As provided greater opportunity to move into prosperous markets. This wave’s antitrust 
policies, deficiencies in the global competition were heavily criticized. (Gönüllü, 2017)  
 This period terminated with the burst of millennium balloon and big scandals causing 
revolution in corporate governance like Enron. 
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Table 2.2. 10 Largest M&A Transactions Worldwide 
 
Source: Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, 2019 
 
 2.1.7 Sixth Wave (2003 - 2007) 
 This wave is relatively shorter compared to the previous periods, but also can be 
considered as M&A intensive. This wave began with low-interest rates after the recession in 
the economy and sources to finance M&As were created. Low-interest rate and soaring 
market conditions enabled the rise of private equities, leveraged buyouts became extremely 
inexpensive for them. They could borrow money with fascinating rates to establish a capital, 
then purchase companies or parts of it with this raised capital and finally by maximizing the 
profits of these acquired companies sell them to make great profits. Hence, this was the era 
of private equity firms. They borrowed with very little rates and after sale enjoyed the high 
returns, this opened the appetite for M&A targets. (McCarthy, 2011) 
 As in the fourth wave, companies preferred to finance mergers and acquisitions by 
paying cash or by getting into debt rather than their equity. Acquirers had cash-balance 
abundance, therefore financing M&A deals with free cash/debt became more common and 
only a few of the deals in this period was financed with equity in contrast to 1990s. (Harford, 
2005)  
Ranking Year Acquirer Target Value ($) Value (€)
1 1999 Vodafone AirTouch PLC Mannesmann AG 202,7 204,7
2 2000 America Online Inc Time Warner 164,7 160,7
3 2013 Verizon Communications Inc Verizon Wireless Inc 130,2 100,5
4 2007 Shareholders (Spin out) Philip Morris Intl Inc 107,6 68,1
5 2015 Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA/NV SABMiller PLC 101,5 92,3
6 2007 RFS Holdings BV ABN-AMRO Holding NV 98,2 71,3
7 1999 Pfizer Inc Warner-Lambert Co 89,6 85,3
8 2017 Walt Disney Co 21st Century Fox Inc 84,2 72,5
9 2016 AT&T Inc Time Warner Inc 79,4 72,9
10 2019 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co Celgene Corp 79,4 69,7
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 However, these sixth-period deals couldn’t create value for acquiring parties, on the 
contrary, they ended up with the loss of a great deal of money. A reason for this can be 
explained as due to great cash reserves, acquirers were really robust and paying cash during 
deals might cause free cash flow complication. (Jensen, 1986) Targets shared the same 
destiny or even poorer abnormal returns. (Alexandridis et al., 2011) 
 Eventually, in 2007 subprime mortgage crisis burst out and these companies which 
were enjoying the low rates could not attain inexpensive debt and keen investors. With the 
subsequent recession in the economy, this period came to end. (Gaughan, 2015) 
Figure 2.4. and Figure 2.5 provides an overall view of the M&A deals for the period 
of 1985-2006.  
[Appendix B: Figure 2.4. Global Deal Values] 
[Appendix B: Figure 2.5. Number of Deals Worldwide] 
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
 In the global dimension, there is a wide-ranging documentation measuring how the 
stock price performance of M&As on the pre-and post-disclosure period affected. There are 
several types of research conducted on this subjected so here is some around the world. 
 The major purpose of the studies regarding merger and acquisitions (M&A) is to 
investigate whether the stock prices of companies subjected to M&A appreciate or depreciate 
and correspondingly whether shareholders gain profit. In these studies, it is tested whether 
abnormal returns (ARs) is attained with mergers and acquisitions. Some studies measure the 
immediate effect of the announcement on the prices within a very short event window 
whereas others concentrate on long term performance of the company. (Yılgör, 2014) 
 
3.1 Developed Markets 
 Liargovas and Spyridon (2011) examined the impact of mergers and acquisition 
announcements on Greek industry. At the end of their study, in which event study 
methodology has been conducted, semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis has been 
declined for Athens Stock Exchange Market. 10 days before the disclosure of M&As, 
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shareholders gained substantial positive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and 
results show that positive CAARs had been achieved after the announcement of diversifying 
and horizontal M&As. Overall outcomes demonstrates that banking M&As do not generate 
wealth for acquiring parties. 
Alexandridis, Petmezas and Travlos (2010) chose several developed markets to test 
their theory which are UK, US and Canada.  Their findings showed that the best-case scenario 
for acquirers to have a zero AR or more commonly negative ARs around the disclosure dates. 
On the other hand, acquirers from these countries gain with the less premia payment. On the 
contrary to the previous studies, targets from these markets make considerably less one-sided 
profit, namely, there is an even, fair distribution of benefits. 
 Nystad and Grinden (2013) investigated abnormal returns of acquirers for both large 
and small companies in Norwegian Stock Exchange and AR was calculated both in euro and 
NOK5. The results showed that acquirers experience an average 2.16% AR in €, but AR 
calculation in NOK shows that acquirers had statically insignificant negative ARs. On the 
other hand, it has been proved that ARs were changing depending on the company size. AR 
is 0.22% for large size companies whereas it is 4.10% for smaller size companies. As it can 
be observed M&A deals create value for acquirers depending on some circumstances. 
 Schaik and Steenbeek (2004) have studied the non-financial mergers in Japan for the 
period of 1993-2003. Consistent with the findings of Nystad and Grinden (2013), they found 
positive AR of 1.4% around the disclosure date and highest return achieved two days before 
the announcement, however, it is detected that these gains had quite short life and they 
                                                          
5 Norwegian Krone: National currency of Norway 
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vanished shortly after. Observed CARs of (-1,0), (-1,1), (-5,5) are 1.37%, 0.57% and 0.87% 
respectively.  
 Adnan and Hossain (2016) studied merger disclosure and effect on the share prices 
of both acquirers and targets in the US market via event study methodology in 2015. During 
the study, the role of insider data was measured and clarified. Results indicated there is an 
observed increase in bidder and target stock prices. They propose two explanation: 
information leakage or good new expectancy. Pre-announcement CAARs are increasing 
from 0.64% (5 days before) until 1.04%. However, there is an observed decrease in the bidder 
stock prices during post-event period; CAARs are falling with the announcement day from 
0.98% till 0.01% (-5,3) and followed by an increase until 1.01% (-5,5). This shows the 
incoherency of returns. 
 Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) defended the argument that the most 
trustworthy method to survey whether a merger and acquisition deal produces value is to 
observe the returns in a short-term event window. They investigated 3,688 samples for the 
period of 1973-1998. Findings are calculated and presented in 9-years group and results are 
-0.3% (’73- ’79), -0.4% (’80-’89), -1.0% (’90-’98) and -0.7 (’73-’98). Even though results 
are negative, they claimed that this is not reliable information.  
 Martynova and Renneboog (2006) investigated the European takeover market (2,419 
samples) for the period of 1993-2001.  Their sample includes 28 European countries, Ireland 
and the UK. Although calculated CAARs are statistically significant and positive for 
acquirers, they are still less compared to target returns; 0.5% on the disclosure date. It is 
detected that samples coinciding the end of fifth merger wave ruined acquirers’ value. 
According to them, the reason for this failure is because of the hubris, limited data processing 
and self-regard of managers. 
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 Ings and Inoue’s (2012) findings are also consistent with the previous works. They 
have analyzed Japanese bidder companies for the period of 2000-2010 to investigate 
shareholder wealth impact on domestic and international acquisitions. Findings revealed that 
domestic acquisitions are less profitable than the cross-borders. Cross-border transactions 
generate 1% CAAR, whereas domestic deals could only manage 0.4%, within three days (-
1,1) event window. 
 
3.2 Emerging Markets 
 Shah and Arora (2014) aimed to survey the effect of 37 M&A announcements which 
were made in Asia-Pacific region, on bidder and target share price returns for the period of 
March 2013-September 2013. During the study, for various event windows “event study 
methodology” had been used to measure the CAAR on bidding and target companies’ share 
prices. Paired sample t-test had been applied by comparing target and acquiring companies’ 
pre- and post-announcement stock price return within a (-2, 2) event window. It had been 
observed that target returns generated statistically significant positive CAARs, different than 
zero, whereas in all the event windows the acquirer CAARs were statistically irrelevant. It 
was indicated that pre-disclosure returns were considerably less than post-disclosure returns 
and also detected that market reaction given to the announcements were really formidable. 
 Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) analyzed ARs for 64 acquisitions from South Africa 
including both target and acquiring for the period of March 1998 - December 2002. Event 
study methodology had been conducted throughout the research for CAAR calculations. For 
the maximum event window of (-10, 10), findings had been interpreted. As a result, 
Mushidzhi and Ward proved that average abnormal returns (AARs) increased significantly 
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positive of targets two days before the disclosure date with a halt on day-0 (announcement 
date) and a downward behavior until +2 days. In the following days, it continued to fluctuate. 
On the other hand, there was no significant alteration in acquirer AARs’ not event on the 
disclosure date. 
Sylvani and Yunita (2017) investigate market response against merger and 
acquisitions in the telecommunication sector in the Asia-Pacific region. The sample contains 
17 observations for the period of 2011-2014. For abnormal returns (AR) computation 21 days 
window (-10, 10) with 100 days estimation period was used. The primary aim of this project 
was to assess the impact of the disclosure on stock price return, stock price volatility and 
trading volume via event study methodology. However, findings showed that there is not 
much of an influence on ARs during the pre-post announcement period. 
 Moeller and Zhu (2016) analyzed the short-time effects of cross-border deals among 
Chinese public listed firms and British companies during 2012-2016. During the research, 
four different event windows were formed and consequently obtained data had been 
measured through event study methodology. Results show that Chinese acquirers had 
attained significant positive ARs in the very first day of the post-disclosure date, however, it 
was monitored that these ARs had been lost through time. Furthermore, as the event study 
was applied to sub-sectors, it is inspected that Chinese bidders in several sectors including 
real estate enjoyed the positive ARs while the ones in financial sector bore negative ARs. 
 Keown and Pinkerton (1981) proved that there were positive abnormal returns in 
acquiring parties’ share prices enjoyed by the investors before the public disclosure regarding 
projected mergers had been taken place. This study had been applied to 194 sample 
companies. However, the results affirmed that there were leakages and company secrets such 
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as this could not be kept as a secret. Especially, the fact that excess returns dated back to 
twelve days before the disclosure show the severity of the leakage issue.  
 Sehgal, Banerjee and Deisting (2012) examined whether merger and acquisition 
disclosures and deal financing methods have any impact on excess returns. As sample BRICS 
countries were chosen for the period of 2005-2009 however, researchers described their 
sample as BRICKS countries by adding South Korea also in the group and study was 
conducted through event study methodology. It was observed that 5 out of 6 countries have 
benefited from the pre-announcement ARs. Consistent with the Keown and Pinkerton’s 
(1981) research, the results point out possible leakages. South Korea, China and India 
experienced negative ARs during post-evet period whereas South Africa enjoyed positive 
ARs. It was also discovered that deal disclosures do not have noteworthy influence on the 
trading capacity and the stock prices. Nonetheless, there is observed decline in return 
fluctuation. 
 In their study, Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) have calculated acquirer abnormal returns 
listed in Korean Stock Exchange by using market model for the period of 1981-1997. 
According to their findings, all ARs calculated within the event window are statistically 
relevant. At 5% significance level their CAARs of (-1,0), (-5,5), (-10,10) are 1.23%, 2.67%, 
3.39% respectively. 
 
 Examples from Turkish Literature 
 Nowadays, this topic started to be trend topic in Turkey and some recent studies can 
be exemplified as below. 
 The study conducted by Çıtak and Yıldız (2007) investigated 40 acquisitions and 
abnormal returns (ARs), cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquirers had been 
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computed. It is ascertained that post-sales ARs of acquirers are not statistically meaningful. 
Furthermore, if the deal is a merger deal, it is likely that there will be negative CAARs 
whereas, in the case of an acquisition, there will be positive ARs. According to Çıtak and 
Yıldız, if the deal amount paid by cash, AR returns are positive but if it is made by shares, 
ARs will be negative. 
 Yılmaz (2010) researched the effect of M&A deals on share prices of bidders and 
targets, investigated 51 deals occurred within 2002-2008. Results are presented as 1-month,3-
months and 6-months. It is proved that in the 1-month period (-30,30) pre-disclosure ARs 
(2.56%) are greater than the post-event (0.94%) period. There is a subsequent surge in the 
post-disclosure ARs; 3-months and 6-months ARs are 0.96% and 6.45% respectively. 
However, t-test proves that before and after announcement period differences are not 
statistically meaningful. 
 Reis (2015) examined the impact of merger and acquisition announcement on Turkish 
acquirer returns and the determinants of these returns for the period of 1994-2013.  Results 
obtained through standard event study methodology presents a 2.27% cumulative abnormal 
return during 11-day (-5, 5) event window.  CAARs were compared under the several 
determinants such as merger vs. acquisition, same vs. unrelated business, target country 
(cross-border vs. domestic), etc. Results present that merger returns are greater than 
acquisition returns and same relation is valid for companies performing in same industry line 
compared to unrelated business line. 
Eceyurt and Serçemeli (2013) concocted their study on a quite smaller group of 5 
sample deals completed during 2008-2009. It was detected that in the 360-day (-180,180) 
event window, there were no ARs compared to the index. It is more likely to obtain little 
returns within the 10-days (-5,5) and 60-days (-30,30) period. However, as they claimed that 
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the main objective of a merger of an acquisition is to make increase the market value. It was 
found unlikely to attain this target.  
 Findings of Çevikçelik’s (2012) are somehow coherent with the previous works. She 
used 10- and 30-days event window and observed and an increase in the pre-event period. 
However, this increase reached the peak value either on the event date or the first post-event 
day and started the fall in the following days. Post-event CAAR trends were observed higher 
than the pre-event trends. Increase in the pre-event period interpreted as the leakage of the 
intercompany information. All in all, it is confirmed that IMKB is not even half-effective and 
that is why it is possible to achieve an abnormal return in the short-term period. 
 Last but not least, Genç and Coşkun (2013) investigated the impact of both M&A 
deal announcements and completions on the share prices within an 81-day event window. 
Results were calculated for both acquirers (138 observations) and targets (76 observations) 
for the period 2001-2011. They presented that target shareholder experience more abnormal 
returns than the acquirer shareholders. Even though there were calculated positive abnormal 
returns, they were not statistically meaningful and not non-zero. CAARs for (-1,0), (0,1) and 
(-2,1) are 1.14%, 1.06% and 2.04% respectively for the acquirers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF ACQUIRER RETURNS 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 4.1.1 Introduction 
 Event study methodology is used to estimate the influence of a precise economic 
incident on the value of the company by utilizing historical financial data. (Campbell et al., 
1996) McWilliams and Siegel (1997) listed the basic assumptions behind event study 
methodology as so;  
 Impact of such an incident will be instantly reflected in the stock prices (efficient-
market hypothesis). 
 There are no insider information leakages and market is informed about the event 
upon the announcement. 
 There is no other event affecting the stock prices in the given event window.  
Fisch et al. (2018) listed the steps to follow to conduct an event study as below: 
i. Event(s) subjected to study must be defined and the dates (announcement, 
completion), windows (event & estimation) must be identified 
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ii. Actual returns must be computed for the stocks of the companies in discussion 
iii. Expected returns for the same group must be estimated with the help of historical data 
iv. ARs (and CAARs, if required) must be computed (ARit = Rit - E(Rit)) 
v. Finally, in the light of acquired data ARs must be evaluated if the results are 
statistically significant. 
 
 4.1.2 Brief History on Event Study 
 Although event study methodology seems like new method, actually it has quite a 
long history. It is assumed that the first published work conducted by Dolley (1933). He 
analyzed how stock split-ups affect the prices in the light of nominal price alteration during 
these splits take place. There is an observed sophistication and complexity increase in the 
researches carried out through the 1930s till 1960s. Studies conducted by Myers and Bakay 
(1948), Ashley (1962) can be examples of this period. Myers and Bakay (1948) investigated 
also the split-up impact on prices, however, unlike Dolley they observed effects before and 
after the event to have a more comprehensive understanding. Ashley (1962), on the other 
hand, benefited from the event study method in the evaluation of the stock prices with respect 
to changes in the earnings and dividends. Nonetheless, current version of the event study 
method which is still in use, introduced by Ball and Brown (1968), Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and 
Roll (1969). Ball and Brown (1968) examined the utility of existing by exploring their 
information content. Fama et al. (1969) concentrated on evaluating the process of stock price 
adjustment to the incoming information (such as dividend increases) contained in the stock 
split and explaining the impact of stock splits independent from the external factors. These 
pioneering researches triggered a flow of change in the fundamental methodology, so manage 
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complexity in the previous works and create a base for more precise hypotheses. Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) justified in their works the necessity and the significance of these 
alterations. The study performed in 1980 assesses the performance of stock price via several 
methodologies such as mean and market-adjusted returns, etc. Characteristics of monthly 
stock returns were investigated. On the other hand, the study carried out in 1985 deals with 
the daily stock returns and handles the problems arising from that. Ahorony and Swary (1980) 
examined the effect of dividend announcements which were made quarterly on stock prices 
with dividend expectation model and reached the result of a positive impact. MacKinlay 
(1997) presented various types of event study methodology revision, evaluated their strength 
and inabilities. His work proved that prices do react to fresh information. 
 
4.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return Calculation (CAR) 
As explained in the methodology part, after deciding on the sample and the event 
dates, very first step to follow is the calculation of the actual returns for every observation in 
the sample separately. Daily return of stock prices was calculated through this formula: 
 
 
R i,t = [
𝑃(𝑖,𝑡+1)−𝑃(𝑖,𝑡)
𝑃(𝑖,𝑡)
] (1) 
 
Ri,t : is the daily return of company i at time t 
Pi,t : is the stock price of company i at time t 
Pi, t+1: is the stock price of company i at time t+1 
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On the other hand, for the calculation of market return BIST-100 closing prices were taken 
as base and the calculation is the same as daily return of stocks: 
 
 
Rm,t = [
𝑃(𝑚,𝑡+1)−𝑃(𝑚,𝑡)
𝑃(𝑚,𝑡)
] (2) 
 
Rm,t : is the daily return of index at time t 
Pm,t : is the closing price of index at time t 
Pm, t+1: is the closing price of index at time t+1 
 
Third step is the calculation of the expected returns. The most common method to 
measure expected returns are asset pricing modals and among them most preferred model is 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This theory introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Litner 
(1965) predicts that the expected return of an assets can be explained through three variables. 
These variables are the beta of the asset (β), risk-free rate (Rf) and the market return E(Rm).  
 
 
E(Ri) = Rf + [E(Rm) – Rf]βi (3) 
 
In the determined estimation period for this study OLS (Ordinary Least Squares 
Method) was used to calculate model parameters (α, β) with regression method within the 
event windows. As a result, model is adjusted as below.  
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E(Ri,t )= αi+ βi(Rm,t)+ei,t (4) 
 
E(Ri,t ) is the expected return of  stock I, at time t. Rm,t is the return of the market portfolio 
and α (constant term, intercept), β (slope) are market variables. ei,t is the random error term 
and considered as a dummy variable that’s why it is assumed that ei,t =0 and it is excluded 
from the equation. In my study to calculate the expected return of portfolio, capital asset 
pricing model which was adjusted for OLS had been used. 
Last phase is the calculation of abnormal (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Abnormal return is defined as any extra return on a given actual return which can be both 
negative and positive. Cumulative abnormal return on the other hand, is sum total of all 
abnormal returns in the specific event window.  
 
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) (5) 
 
 
CARi,T =∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  (6) 
  
 As a final step t-test will be used to evaluate mean differences, Wilcoxon signed-rank 
and Mann-Whitney tests to measure the differences of medians to decide on levels of 
significance. 
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4.3 Sample 
 In order companies to be included in this study, they should satisfy the following 
principles proposed by Reis (2015):  
i. The transaction is listed as completed with an announcement date in the sample 
period;  
ii. The acquirer firm is a publicly traded company on the Turkish Stock Exchange (Borsa 
Istanbul);  
iii. The transaction is identified as a “merger”, “acquisition of majority interest”;  
iv. The acquiring firm is a non-financial firm;  
v. The acquirer does not own more than 20% of the target firm prior to the event date 
and owns at least 50% after the event date 
 In this research, there are 327 mergers and acquisitions listed as completed in the 
database for my research period (1992-2014). Main database contains 46 “mergers”, 119 
“acquisition of majority assets”. However, as the non-financial acquirer companies excluded, 
that left us with 33 “mergers”, 80 “acquisition of majority assets”. Unfortunately, some of 
these companies either ceased to exist or they had merged to other companies and in both 
cases, they had to be eliminated from the sample because the company stock price data was 
not available. Consequently, a sum of 80 companies ensure the criteria above. 
 
 4.3.1 Sample Description 
 The sample of 80 companies were divided into 3 sub categories to determine the 
effect even further as form of transaction (merger & acquisition of majority of assets), 
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industry relatedness (same & unrelated) and target public status (private & public). Due to 
the fact that all sample deals took place in Turkey, cross-border effect cannot be measured. 
The sample contains 57 (71,25%) acquisition of majority assets compared to only 23 mergers 
(28.75%). It is obvious that acquisition deals are more preferred in Turkey.  Furthermore, 
62,50% (50) of the deals realized between unrelated businesses whereas 37,50% (30) of them 
occurred between the same businesses. In this field, it is observed that dominance is on the 
deals between unrelated industries. Last but not least, last examination point was target public 
status. The sample consists of 68 (85%) private target companies and 12 (15%) public targets. 
 
[Appendix D: Sample Description Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics] 
  
 Table 4.2. presents the distribution of merger and acquisition deals through years in 
the sample. There is an observed increment in the number of deals from 1993 until 2014. 
However, main dominance in the sample comes from 2008-2014. As Akdoğu (2011) 
explained her research, Turkey did not experience all six merger waves; there are two 
observed merger waves in Turkey. Second merger wave from 2005 onwards is consistent 
with my sample.  Decline in the number of deals in 2009 can be explained with the economic 
recession period after 2008 crisis. Nevertheless, deal amounts speed up acceleratingly in the 
following years and makes a peak in 2011. Because 2014 data is until the end of August, 
there is a reduction in the number of deals but that does not reflect the correct amount. 
[Appendix D: Sample Description Table 4.2. Distribution of M&A Deals through 
Years] 
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 Table 4.3. demonstrates distribution of acquirer industries in the sample. The greatest 
percentage belongs to “Power” industry with 11% and it is followed by “Oil & Gas” industry 
and “Food & Beverage” sector with respectively 10% and 9%. By looking at the sample 
distribution, acquirer industry is dominated by energy sector. 
 
[Appendix D: Sample Description Table 4.3. Distribution of Industries of Acquirers] 
  
 On the other hand, Table 4.4. provides the distribution among target industries. In 
target industry, distribution is not as smooth as in acquirers’ but power industry is still leading 
the sample. It has 16% share. As the sample investigated thoroughly, more than half of these 
targets in power industry made deals in the same industry with other companies operating in 
the same field. Second biggest portion belongs to “Food & Beverage” sector with 8%. Third 
place is shared between “Oil & Gas” industry and “Metals & Mining” industry with 6%. 
 
[Appendix D: Sample Description Table 4.4. Distribution of Industries of Targets] 
 
4.4 Event Windows 
Event window selection is one most crucial elements of an event study. Before further 
calculations, estimation and event windows should be clearly defined. Estimation period 
must be purified from the effects of possible events affecting stock prices. On the other hand, 
event window must be in an appropriate length to capture the full effect of a given event. In 
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practice measuring acquirer returns, the most well-accepted estimation window covers 
minimum of (-100, 60) period. It gives even better results if period starts 240-300 days 
before. Whereas in event window duration is significantly shorter due to the effective market 
assumption. It is advised that event window should cover the first early impact (pre & post) 
of the event, in other words should not be too short as well. That is why, 11 days (-5, 5) event 
window is favored by assuming that event day is zero (0). 
During this study, the event date (announcement/disclosure date) is considered as 
“Day 0” and short-term event window is shaped around the event day and maximum of 10-
day (-5, 5). However, the estimation period contains a slightly longer period. In my study, I 
took the period of 300 days before the announcement day, but to be to avoid any kind of 
speculations estimation period is (-60, -300). So, it covers a period of 240 days.  In the cases, 
240-day estimation date is not available; I followed the rule of “minimum 100 days data 
should be presented”. 
 
Figure 4.1. Estimation and Event Windows 
 
4.5 Results 
 In this section, univariate analysis of CARs of Turkish acquiring companies were 
presented, in other words, only one variable was examined at a time. Cumulative average 
-300 -60 -5 0 +5
Event Day
Estimation Period
Event Window
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abnormal returns were related to three distinctive characteristics of acquiring and target 
companies which are form of transaction (merger vs. acquisition of majority assets), industry 
relatedness (same vs. unrelated), target public status (private vs. public). 
 Table 4.5 presents mean and median CARs for the full sample of 80 observations. 
For the all observations, the largest event window of 11 days (-5, 5) presents negative mean 
and median CAR of -0.08% and -0.57% respectively. Other outstanding event windows of 
(0, 1), (0, 2) and (-1, 5) provides positive cumulative abnormal return of 0.41%, 0.82% and 
0.59% correspondingly. Although there is an upward trend during the post-event period, all 
means and medians differ statistically insignificant from zero for all event windows 
according to both t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test results. At this point results are 
inconclusive; empirical evidence shows that some attain significance returns whereas others 
obtain insignificant CARs. Same is also valid for positivity and negativity for outcome. 
Nevertheless, at (-1, 1) event window my results are consistent with the work of Holmen and 
Knopf (2004), Shah and Arora (2014), Andrade et al. (2001) that examined acquirer returns 
for short event windows and obtained results insignificantly different than zero. As results 
revealed that null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The fact that there is no significant abnormal 
return acquired resulting from merger and acquisition announcements points out the lack of 
informational value formed for acquiring party shareholders. 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Table 4.5. Full Sample 
CARs] 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Figure 4.2 Mean CAR 
Chart for Full Sample] 
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 In Table 4.6. CARs for mergers and acquisition of majority assets for acquirers were 
compared. Almost in all event windows merger cumulative abnormal returns are greater than 
acquisition returns. However, among these only two event windows have statistical 
significance and this significance is not persistent across the whole sample. For (-2, 0) event 
window, mean for mergers is 1.90% and -0.30% for the acquisition. Their difference is 
significant at 5% level. In addition, merger mean is 1.74% and acquisition mean is -0.81% 
for (-3,1) event window with a significance at 5% level. Findings in these two event windows 
are consistent with Reis’s (2015) research that examined acquirer returns in Turkey and 
obtained significant results for most of the event windows. Moreover, for the largest event 
window (-5, 5) in the sample, mean CAR of mergers is 1.21% whereas it is -0,60% for 
acquisitions. Moreover, in their research Martynova and Renneboog (2006) investigated 
M&A deals in Europe and presented that mergers generate reliably greater returns than 
acquisition of majority assets.  
 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Table 4.6. Merger vs. 
Acquisition of Majority Assets CARs] 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Figure 4.3 Mean CAR 
Comparison (Merger vs Acquisition)] 
 
 Table 4.7. shows the distribution of comparison of same versus unrelated industry 
among the acquirer companies. By looking at the mean CAR values, at the pre-event window 
companies operating in the same industry performs better. On the other hand, CAR values of 
companies operating in unrelated industries starts to perform better during post-event period 
and mean CARs increases as the window gets larger to the post-evet side. Companies 
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belonging to same industry at (-2,0), (-1,0) (0, 1) event windows generate CARs of 1.16%, 
0.70% and 0.54% respectively. Companies with unrelated industry achieve 1.15%, 0.95% 
and 0.97% CAR values at (0,2), (-1,3) and (-1,5) event windows correspondingly. At the 
largest event window of (-5,5) 0,26% CAR in unrelated industry and -0.65% in same industry 
were earned. However, according to the results of Mann-Whitney test among these windows 
only (-2,0) window produced a significant CAR at 10% level. 
 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Table 4.7. Same vs. 
Unrelated Industry CARs] 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Figure 4.4 Mean CAR 
Comparison (Same vs Unrelated Industry)] 
 
 Table 4.8 compares private and public target cumulative abnormal returns. For (-5, 
5) event window, calculated private target return is 0.54% and -3.63% for the public target 
returns. Private targets generate higher cumulative abnormal return than public returns across 
the sample. This is supported by the literature presented by Chang (1998); Moeller et al. 
(2004); Faccio et al. (2006) However, no statistical significance observed at any level for the 
difference.  Faccio et al. (2006) obtained an insignificant AAR of -0.38% in public targets 
and this finding is consistent with my research. Furthermore, insignificant returns obtained 
from Turkish private and public returns are consistent with Reis’s (2015) study. In other 
words, according to the results market is indifferent to public status of target companies. 
 
[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Table 4.8. Private vs. 
Public Target CARs] 
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[Appendix E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Figure 4.5 Mean CAR 
Comparison (Private vs Public)] 
 
Moreover, as a result of literature review, I formed the table below from the studies which 
researched the acquirer returns after M&A announcements. I divided market data into two 
group as developed & emerging and observed that in the short event window results are no 
so different than each other. As mentioned before statistical significance is inconclusive 
through the empirical evidence. Table 3.1. provides the detailed list. 
 
Table 4.9. Summary List of Acquirer CAR in Global Context 
 
Period 
Event 
Window 
Average 
CAR 
Significant 
Results 
Insignificant 
Results 
Developed Market           
Asia 2000-2010 (-1, 1) 0.55% 3 2 
Europe 1990-2011 (-1, 1) 1.02% 8 6 
UK & US 1973-2000 (-2, 2) 0.13% 4 2 
 
     
Emerging Market  2000-2013 (-1, 1) 0.85% 8 4 
 
[Appendix C: CAR Table by Countries Table 3.1. Full List CAR Table by Countries] 
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CONCLUSION 
 Technological advances and shrinking profit margins with escalating competition in 
global markets led the companies to grow. Additionally, motives like synergy, economies of 
scale, possession of skilled and capable managerial force, tax advantages, reducing risk 
through diversification increased the tendency of companies to enter merger and acquisition 
deal.   
 Merger means one or more companies becoming one entity by combining their assets 
and liabilities. It results with the termination of the legal entity of one or all to continue as a 
new entity. On the other hand, in an acquisition a target company is determined and assets or 
stocks of these company is purchased to get a controlling share in the target company. M&A 
deal may occur in various ways but the most common ones are horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate integrations.  
 Although this is a relatively new concept in Turkey, it has a long history in global 
context especially in the US. The cyclical merger movements in the US history was named 
as “merger waves”. There are six observed merger waves until now and it is believed that we 
are currently experiencing the seventh wave.  
 Primary object of this study was to examine the impact of merger and acquisition 
announcements on stock prices of the acquiring company for the period of 1994-2014. Event 
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study methodology was followed though the research. First, a sample of 80 observations was 
chosen through a selection criterion, event window ([-5, 5] -largest) and estimation periods 
(60 days before the event date and minimum of 100 days) were defined, daily returns were 
calculated, expected returns were obtained through CAPM model and abnormal returns were 
evaluated via t-tests.  
 Results of such studies are inconclusive in global literature; some obtain significance, 
some cannot, some attain positive abnormal returns, some negative. Findings of my research 
shows no significance in the full sample at all event windows. At this point, my results are 
consistent with the works of Holmen and Knopf (2004), Shah and Arora (2014), Andrade et 
al. (2001). Moreover, to get a better comprehensive idea sample was divided into three 
groups as “merger vs acquisition”, “same vs unrelated industry”, “public vs. private target” 
and the results were compared. Merger vs acquisition comparison reported significance at 
5% level for the windows (-2,0) and (-3,1).  Same vs unrelated comparison provided a week 
evidence but proved significance at 10% level for (-2,0) window. On the other hand, target 
public status comparison provided significance of 10% for (0,2) interval. All in all, because 
of the weak results obtained, H0 hypothesis could not be rejected, in other words, there is not 
enough evidence to say that CAR values are different than zero.  
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APPENDIX A: Table 2.1. Summary Table of Merger Waves 
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APPENDIX B: Global Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Figure 2.4. Global Deal Values 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Number of Deals Worldwide 
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APPENDIX C: CAR Table by Countries 
Table 3.1. Full List CAR Table by Countries 
Country/Region Period Event Window 
Acquirer 
CARs 
Research 
Asia-Pasific 05/2013-09/2013 (-2,2) 1.20% Shah, Arora (2014) 
Austria 1993-2003 (-1,1) 0.96% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Belgium 1993-2001 (-1,1) 1.11% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Brazil 2005-2009 (-1,1) 4.12% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
Canada 1964-1983 (-1,0) 1.14% Eckbo (1986) 
China 2005-2009 (-1,1) 5.18% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
China 2000-2007 (-1,0) -1.50% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
China 2000-2012 (-1,1) 1.22% Tao,et al (2017) 
Denmark 1993-2002 (-1,1) 0.90% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Europe 1998-2000 (-1,1) 0.70% Campa and Hernando (2004) 
Finland 1993-2004 (-1,1) 3.78% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
France 2000-2011 (-1,1) 0.38% Sharma, Raat (2016) 
France 1993-2008 (-1,1) 0.60% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Germany 1981-2010 (-1,1) 0.01% Mager, Meyer-Fackler (2017) 
Germany 1993-2009 (-1,1) 0.73% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Hong Kong 2000-2007 (-1,0) -0.33% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
Hong Kong 2000-2005 (-1,1) 1.73% Ma, Pagán, Chu (2009) 
India 2005-2009 (-1,1) -1.04% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
Italy 1993-2005 (-1,1) 1.38% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Japan 1993-2003 (-1,1) 0.57% Schaik, Steenbeek (2004) 
Japan 2000-2007 (-1,0) 0.25% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
Japan 2000-2010 (-1,1) 0.59% Ings, Inoue (2018) 
Korea 1981-1997 (-1,1) 1.84% Bae, Kang, Kim (2002) 
Luxemburg 1993-2007 (-1,1) -0.02% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Netherlands 2000-2011 (-1,1) 0.36% Sharma, Raat (2016) 
Norway 2000-2011 (-1,1) 2.16% Nystad, Grinden (2013) 
Philippines 2000-2005 (-1,1) 0.12% Ma, Pagán, Chu (2009) 
Russia 2005-2009 (-1,1) 2.52% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
Singapore 2000-2007 (-1,0) 0.50% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
South Africa 2005-2009 (-1,1) 2.39% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
South Korea 2005-2009 (-1,1) 2.15% Sehgal, Banerjee,Deisting (2012) 
South Korea 2000-2007 (-1,0) -1.13% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
Spain 1993-2006 (-1,1) 0.80% Martynova, Renneboog (2006) 
Sweden 1985-1995 (-1,1) 0.04% Holmen, Knopf (2004) 
Switzerland 1990-2001 (-1,1) 1.07% 
Lowinski, Schiereck, Thomas 
(2004) 
Taiwan 2000-2007 (-1,0) -0.55% Wong, Cheung, Mun (2009) 
UK 1990-1998 (-1,1) -0.46% Raj, Forsyth (2003) 
UK 1983-1995 (-1,1) -1.39% Sudarsanam, Mahate (2003) 
US 1973-1998 (-1,1) -0.70% Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford (2001) 
US 1990-2000 (-2,2) 1.45% Bradley, Sundaram (2004) 
US 1990-2000 (-2,2) 1.77% Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller (2002) 
Vietnam 2004-2013 (-1,1) -0.28% Phama,Oh,Pech (2015) 
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APPENDIX D: Sample Description 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Form of the Transaction N 
Acquisition of 
Majority Assets Merger 
 80 57 23 
    
  71.25% 28.75% 
    
    
    
Target Public Status N Private Public 
 80 68 12 
    
  85% 15% 
    
    
    
Same/Unrelated Industry  N Same Industry 
Unrelated 
Industry 
 80 30 50 
    
  37.50% 62.50% 
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Table 4.2. Distribution of M&A Deals through Years 
 
Year 
Number of 
Transactions 
% of Total 
Sample 
1993 2 0.02 
1994 1 0.01 
1997 2 0.02 
1999 1 0.01 
2000 3 0.04 
2001 3 0.04 
2002 2 0.02 
2003 2 0.02 
2004 1 0.01 
2005 2 0.02 
2006 3 0.04 
2007 2 0.02 
2008 7 0.08 
2009 4 0.05 
2010 9 0.11 
2011 16 0.19 
2012 11 0.13 
2013 10 0.12 
2014 4 0.05 
Total 85 100.00 
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Table 4.3. Distribution of Industries of Acquirers 
 
Acquirer Industry 
Number of 
Observations 
% of Total 
Sample 
Agriculture & Livestock 1 0.01 
Automobiles & Components 3 0.04 
Building/Construction 6 0.08 
Chemicals 1 0.01 
Computers & Electronics Retailing 1 0.01 
Computers & Peripherals 1 0.01 
Construction Materials 6 0.08 
Containers & Packaging 2 0.03 
Discount and Department Store Retailing 1 0.01 
Electronics 2 0.03 
Food & Beverage Retailing 3 0.04 
Food and Beverage 7 0.09 
Home Furnishings 2 0.03 
Hospitals 1 0.01 
Hotels and Lodging 1 0.01 
Household & Personal Products 1 0.01 
Metals & Mining 4 0.05 
Oil & Gas 8 0.10 
Paper & Forest Products 1 0.01 
Pharmaceuticals 1 0.01 
Power 9 0.11 
Recreation & Leisure 1 0.01 
Software 4 0.05 
Telecommunications Equipment 1 0.01 
Telecommunications Services 1 0.01 
Textiles & Apparel 5 0.06 
Transportation & Infrastructure 3 0.04 
Wireless 3 0.04 
Total 80 100.00 
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Table 4.4. Distribution of Industries of Targets 
 
Target Industry 
Number of 
Observations 
% of Total 
Sample 
Aerospace & Defense 1 0.01 
Agriculture & Livestock 2 0.03 
Alternative Energy Sources 1 0.01 
Automobiles & Components 2 0.03 
Banks 1 0.01 
Construction Materials 3 0.04 
Containers & Packaging 2 0.03 
Food & Beverage Retailing 3 0.04 
Food and Beverage 6 0.08 
Home Improvement Retailing 1 0.01 
Household & Personal Products 1 0.01 
Insurance 1 0.01 
Internet and Catalog Retailing 1 0.01 
Internet Software 1 0.01 
IT Consulting & Services 4 0.05 
Metals & Mining 5 0.06 
Non-Residential 1 0.01 
Oil & Gas 5 0.06 
Other Consumer Products 2 0.03 
Other Financials 2 0.03 
Other Industrials 1 0.01 
Other Retailing 2 0.03 
Paper & Forest Products 2 0.03 
Pharmaceuticals 2 0.03 
Pipelines 1 0.01 
Power 13 0.16 
Semiconductors 1 0.01 
Software 3 0.04 
Telecommunications Equipment 1 0.01 
Telecommunications Services 1 0.01 
Textiles & Apparel 3 0.04 
Transportation & Infrastructure 4 0.05 
Wireless 1 0.01 
Total 80 100.00 
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APPENDIX E: Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
 
Table 4.5. Full Sample CARs 
Event Windows     N   Mean   Median   Max   Min   T-Test 
Wilcoxon 
signed-
rank test 
CAR [-1,1] 80 0.13% 0.17% 16.78% -15.89% 0.2615 0.4460 
CAR [-2,2] 80 0.55% 0.57% 15.82% -13.69% 0.8752 1.0410 
CAR [-2,0] 80 0.33% -0.26% 17.55% -9.18% 0.6539 -0.3450 
CAR [-1,0] 80 0.32% 0.09% 15.44% -6.79% 0.8325 0.2210 
CAR [0,1] 80 0.41% 0.23% 17.42% -14.26% 0.8762 0.8250 
CAR [0,2] 80 0.82% 0.04% 21.02% -15.33% 1.2755 0.8540 
CAR [-1,3] 80 0.37% 0.47% 18.62% -30.33% 0.4556 0.9020 
CAR [-1,5] 80 0.59% 0.37% 26.19% -14.54% 0.6962 0.4120 
CAR [-3,1] 80 -0.07% -0.43% 21.55% -12.09% -0.1291 -0.3740 
CAR [-5,5] 80 -0.08% -0.57% 30.55% -23.19% -0.0819 -0.2930 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Mean CAR Chart for Full Sample 
 
-0,20%
-0,10%
0,00%
0,10%
0,20%
0,30%
0,40%
0,50%
0,60%
0,70%
0,80%
0,90%
CAR[-3,1] CAR[-2,0] CAR[-1,0] CAR[0,1] CAR[0,2] CAR[-1,1] CAR[-1,3] CAR[-1,5] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-5,5]
MEAN CAR (FULL SAMPLE)
69 
 
 
Table 4.6. Merger vs. Acquisition of Majority Assets CARs 
  
Merger N=23 
Acquisition of 
Majority Assets 
N=57 
Difference 
Event Windows     N   Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean   T-Test 
Mann-
Whitney 
Test / Z-
Value 
CAR [-1,1] 80 0.70% 0.92% -0.10% 0.13% 0.80% 0.7220 0.9620 
CAR [-2,2] 80 1.17% 1.69% 0.30% 0.46% 0.87% 0.6223 0.8030 
CAR [-2,0] 80 1.90% 0.53% -0.31% -0.44% 2.21% 2.0485** 1.9510 
CAR [-1,0] 80 0.81% -0.15% 0.12% 0.09% 0.70% 0.8211 0.4310 
CAR [0,1] 80 1.35% 1.24% 0.03% -0.16% 1.32% 1.2789 1.4400 
CAR [0,2] 80 0.73% 1.14% 0.86% -0.21% -0.13% -0.0918 0.4940 
CAR [-1,3] 80 -0.91% 0.10% 0.88% 1.03% -1.79% -1.0065 -0.7390 
CAR [-1,5] 80 0.48% 0.70% 0.63% 0.32% -0.16% -0.0832 0.1010 
CAR [-3,1] 80 1.74% 1.14% -0.81% -0.57% 2.55% 2.0734** 1.812* 
CAR [-5,5] 80 1.21% 0.08% -0.60% -1.09% 1.81% 0.8086 1.0260 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively   
 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean CAR Comparison (Merger vs Acquisition) 
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Table 4.7. Same vs. Unrelated Industry CARs 
  
Unrelated Industry 
N=50 
Same Industry 
N=30 
Difference 
Event 
Windows   
  N   Mean  Median   Mean Median   Mean   T-Test 
Mann-
Whitney 
Test / Z-
Value 
CAR [-1,1] 80 0.06% 0.19% 0.25% 0.17% -0.18% -0.1782 -0.0050 
CAR [-2,2] 80 0.61% 0.63% 0.44% 0.52% 0.17% 0.1278 0.2140 
CAR [-2,0] 80 -0.17% -0.59% 1.16% 0.35% -1.33% -1.2963 -1.724* 
CAR [-1,0] 80 0.09% 0.07% 0.70% 0.17% -0.61% -0.7644 -0.5420 
CAR [0,1] 80 0.34% 0.06% 0.54% 0.50% -0.20% -0.2063 -0.3330 
CAR [0,2] 80 1.15% -0.03% 0.28% 0.12% 0.87% 0.6546 0.5020 
CAR [-1,3] 80 0.95% 0.46% -0.60% 0.74% 1.55% 0.9331 0.1840 
CAR [-1,5] 80 0.97% 0.65% -0.04% -0.63% 1.01% 0.5764 0.3730 
CAR [-3,1] 80 -0.56% -0.61% 0.73% 0.56% -1.29% -1.0995 -1.1780 
CAR [-5,5] 80 0.26% -0.48% -0.65% -0.62% 0.91% 0.4359 0.1540 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively   
 
 
Figure 4.4 Mean CAR Comparison (Same vs Unrelated Industry) 
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Table 4.8. Private vs. Public Target CARs 
  
Private Target 
N=68 
Public Target 
N=12 
Difference 
Event 
Windows   
  N   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean   T-Test 
Mann-
Whitney 
Test / Z-
Value 
CAR [-1,1] 80 0.15% -0.12% 0.00% 0.58% 0.16% 0.1102 0.2290 
CAR [-2,2] 80 0.90% 1.03% -1.44% -0.18% 2.33% 1.3363 1.5090 
CAR [-2,0] 80 0.34% -0.26% 0.23% -0.21% 0.11% 0.0764 0.633 
CAR [-1,0] 80 0.28% -0.08% 0.55% 0.22% -0.27% -0.2541 0.4850 
CAR [0,1] 80 0.56% 0.32% -0.45% -0.32% 1.01% 0.7718 1.1860 
CAR [0,2] 80 1.24% 0.53% -1.57% -1.08% 2.81% 1.5749 1.752* 
CAR [-1,3] 80 0.54% 1.03% -0.64% -0.27% 1.19% 0.5258 1.0910 
CAR [-1,5] 80 0.96% 0.84% -1.50% -1.40% 2.46% 1.0407 1.2130 
CAR [-3,1] 80 0.09% -0.43% -1.00% -0.26% 1.09% 0.6799 0.7680 
CAR [-5,5] 80 0.54% -0.90% -3.63% -2.90% 4.17% 1.4864 1.6030 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Mean CAR Comparison (Private vs Public) 
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